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GLOBAL MARKETS, RACIAL SPACES AND THE ROLE OF CRITICAL
RACE THEORY IN THE STRUGGLE FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL
OF INVESTMENTS: AN INSTITUTIONAL CLASS ANALYSIS
ELIZABETH M. IGLESIAS*
"All things and all circumstances must first be created on the mental
plane. "I
"The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the domi-
nant material relationships grasped as ideas. 
"2
I. INTRODUCTION
N this essay, I examine the role of law in the production of racial spaces.
An initial comment about the term "racial spaces" is a good place to
start. Viewed through the lens of neo-liberal economic theory, the term
"racial spaces" is a meaningless formulation. This is because, in neo-lib-
eral economics, communities are conceptualized as networks of markets.s
Capital flows reflect the purportedly "color blind" imperatives of profit
maximization, and race neutral laws of supply and demand work to allo-
cate capital to the highest value user across competing networks of mar-
kets according to their competitive and comparative advantages. 4 Indeed,
from this perspective, the redlining practices and disinvestment decisions
through which minority communities in the United States have been con-
verted into ghettos are not only inexplicable, but ultimately immaterial be-
cause "it is difficult to see why communities in general suffer a net harm
when funds are transferred between them (although some communities
may be net importers of credit and others net exporters)., 5
By contrast, the term "racial spaces" refers to a social reality created by
and experienced through patterns of mobility and immobility that have
been organized around the historical practices and logic of white
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Hispanic and Caribbean
Legal Studies, University of Miami School of Law.
1. See U.S. ANDERSEN, THREE MAGIC WORDS 91 (1954).
2. See Karl Marx, The German Ideology, in THE MARX AND ENGELS READER 136-37
(Robert C. Tucker ed., 1972).
3. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Human Rights in International Economic Law: Locat-
ingLatinas/os in the Linkage Debates, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 361, 383 (1997)
(discussing neo-liberalism in context of LatCrit theories).
4. SeeJonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act:
An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REv. 291, 309-10 (1993) (reducing communities to





supremacy-a logic in which neither persons nor capital have ever circu-
lated freely.6 In the United States, practices of racial segregation and dis-
crimination have historically prevented, and continue to prevent, the free
movement of persons.7 The free markets of neo-liberal economic theory
have yet to produce the unrestricted access to housing, employment or
credit that would be necessary, though insufficient, to render every com-
munity a fungible network of markets. 8 In Latin America, racial spaces are
the product of processes both analogous, and at the same time, unique to
a region where white supremacy is mediated through the political appara-
tuses and economic structures of neo-colonial dependency, state corporat-
ism, military bureaucratism and authoritarian repression.9 One need only
consider the involuntary resettlements where the many displaced are en-
camped or imprisoned by local disciplinary apparatuses-in some in-
stances under military order 10 and in other instances, under the auspices
of World Bank project managers." These resettlements are spacial arti-
facts of the relations of power/lessness that entrap and immobilize the vast
majority of the world's peoples, the lack of resources that would enable
them to move freely, and the closed borders that constrain the free market
6. See Robert S. Chang & Keith Aoki, Centering the Immigrant in the Inter/Na-
tional Imagination, 10 LA RAZA L.J. 309, 316-17 (1998) (discussing historical meth-
ods of preserving white supremacy against African-Americans and how they
compare to mobility of new immigrants).
7. For a phenomenological account of the way racism inhibits minority move-
ment through racialized spaces, see Anthony Farley, The Poetics of Color Line Space,
in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: HISTORIES, CROSSROADS AND DIRECTIONS (Francisco
Valdes et al. eds., forthcoming 2000).
8. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Confronting Racial Inequity: LatCrit Reflections on
Law, Class and the Anti-Political Economy (forthcoming 2001) (deconstructing de-
ployment of neo-liberal ideology in legal construction of institutional class
structures).
9. See Iglesias, supra note 3, at 361 (articulating LatCrit perspective on interna-
tional law); Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Foreword: International Law, Human Rights, and
LatCrit Theory, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 177, 178 (1997) (discussing "analysis
of the cultural, political and economic dimensions of white supremacy, particularly
as it impacts Latinas/os").
10. See, e.g., Derrill Bazzy, Nowhere to Go, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 10,
1986, at 22 (reporting on forced relocation of Guatemalan Indians from their vil-
lages to "model villages" as part of Guatemalan army's counter-insurgency strategy
based on Vietnam model); AMERICAN WATCH COMMITTEE, LITTLE HOPE: HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA, JANUARY 1984 TO JANUARY 1985, 25-26 (1985) ("After the
military's massive scorched earth tactics and massacres of 1982 and early 1983,
thousands of Indians, displaced from their lands . . . were resettled in model vil-
lages .... The army represents the ultimate authority in the village; and the
residents were not free to leave."); Joanne Omany, Indians Reoriented at Model Vil-
lage, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1986, at A22 (reporting advantages of living in model
villages).
11. See, e.g., Brian McAllister, The United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: An Opportunity to Forge a New Unity in the Work of the World Bank Among
Human Rights, the Environment, and Sustainable Development, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 689, 711-13 (1993) (discussing World Bank and involuntary
resettlements).
1038 [Vol. 45: p. 1037
GLOBAL MARKETS, RACIAL SPACES
flows of neo-liberalism within the racial parameters delimited by First
World nativism.
These patterns of mobility and immobility are a central element in
the production of racial spaces. But the concept of "racial spaces" has
additional value other than foregrounding aspects of social reality that re-
main inexplicable or immaterial to neo-liberal ideology. As a theoretical
construct, the concept of racial spaces enables new ways of understanding
the production of subordination-understandings that may help resolve
the supposed conflict between class-based and race-based emancipatory
movements. This is because racial spaces are visible artifacts of both racial
segregation and the relations of investment, production and exchange
that are reflected in the export of capital; monopolies of political and eco-
nomic power; and the restricted circulation of goods, services and capital
within racially subordinated communities. Conceptualized in this way, the
very existence of racial spaces raises fundamental questions about the rela-
tionship between racial inequality and the political and economic struc-
tures and processes of the neo-liberal political economy, both here in the
United States and throughout Latin America. Can racial subordination be
eliminated within the institutional arrangements of a neo-liberal political
economy? And, perhaps more to the point, where and how is law impli-
cated in the production of these spaces?
The rest of this Essay is divided into two parts. The first part illus-
trates the kinds of contributions Critical Race Theory can and should be
making to the struggle for social racial justice generally, and to the trans-
formation of racial spaces in particular.' 2 In order to underscore the
global dimensions of this project, I focus on work conducted by the Insti-
tute for Liberty and Democracy in Peru ("ILD") and reported on by the
Peruvian economist Hernando De Soto in his now famous book entitled,
The Other Path.'3 This work analyzes the plight of informal workers in
Peru. According to De Soto, Peruvian poverty is not caused by the struc-
tures of capitalist accumulation, international dependency relations or so-
cial discrimination. 14 Instead, it is caused by a domestic legal system,
which condemns the vast majority of people to the instability, uncertainty
and vulnerability of illegality by making legality inaccessible to all but the
12. For a discussion of the possible contribution of Critical Race Theory, see
infra notes 30-79 and accompanying text.
13. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE
THIRD WORLD (June Abbott trans., Harper & Row, 1989) [hereinafter THE OTHER
PATH].
14. See id. at 131-32 (dismissing traditional theories about the causes of infor-
mal markets and poverty, concluding that insufficiencies in legal system are main
cause of informal communities and poverty in Peru); see alsoJane Kaufman Winn,
Hernando De Soto's The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World, 77 IOWA
L. REv. 899, 902-03 (1992) (book review) (summarizing De Soto's analysis of pov-
erty as caused by legal systems instead of multinational corporations or local capi-
talists and criticizing De Soto for not recognizing role played by racial
discrimination in causing poverty).
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wealthy. 15 Because differential access to legality is more fundamental in
structuring class hierarchies and antagonisms than differential ownership
of the means of production, De Soto proposes an alternative analytical
framework that replaces the Marxist notion of class with what he calls an
"institutional-class paradigm."' 6 In this analytical framework, poverty is a
function of the way the legal system divides "those who obtain advantages
and privileges from the state from the competitive majority against whom
an inadequate legal system discriminates."'
7
De Soto's call for a new theoretical approach and his efforts to articu-
late this new approach as an "institutional-class analysis" offer some impor-
tant points and counterpoints of departure for understanding the role of
law in producing the relations of poverty and marginalization that are
mapped across the globe as racial spaces. In the second part of this Essay,
I develop these counterpoints by offering an alternative institutional-class
analysis.1 8 This alternative framework locates the production of racial
spaces, not per se in the differential access to legality enjoyed by rich and
poor, but rather, in the manner in which law (understood broadly to in-
clude its substantive norms, procedures and institutions) operates in dif-
ferent ways to allocate differential power among competing groups across
many institutional contexts. It is precisely by institutionalizing relations of
differential power that law organizes institutional class structures.' 9 The
degree to which these structures reproduce poverty and subordination de-
pends on the degree to which they enable or disable self-organization and
mobilization among the multivariate collective political identities through
which subordinated groups might seek to transform the political econ-
15. See THE OTHER PATH, supra note 13, at 191-99 (discussing instability of
Peruvian legal system as cause of informal communities, social unrest and
poverty).
16. See id. at 209, 239-40 (shifting focus of analysis from control of means of
production to analysis of role of legal institutions in structuring market economy);
Hernando De Soto, The Informals Pose an Answer to Marx, 12 WASH. U. L.Q. 165,
171-72 (1989) (offering non-Marxist solutions for solving problems of informal
communities in Peru); Winn, supra note 14, at 904 (stating "[w] hen De Soto titled
his book El Otro Sendero, he challenged Marxists in Peru by arguing that Peru could
take another path out of its troubles").
17. THE OTHER PATH, supra note 13, at 198-99 (discussing how excessive regu-
lation ensures that only wealthy businessmen with personal ties to government can
understand and benefit from law); Mario Vargas Llosa, Foreword to HERNANDO DE
SOTO, THE OTHER PATH at xviii (June Abbott trans., Harper & Row 1989) (intro-
ducing De Soto's analysis of Peruvian legal system by stating that "[t]he reality
behind the facade is a discriminating, elitist system run by the smallest of
minorities").
18. For a discussion of this alternative analysis, see infra notes 80-119 and ac-
companying text.
19. See generally The Community Reinvestment Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2901-2907
(1988); Daniel D. Bradlow, International Organizations and Private Complaints: The
Case of the World Bank Inspection Panel, 34 VA.J. INT'L L. 553 (1994). For a discus-
sion of these two legal institutions as examples of how law can shape and organize
power relationships, see infra notes 80-119 and accompanying text.
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omy.20 To illustrate the elements of this kind of institutional-class analysis,
I focus specifically on the institutional class structures that are organized
in and around two particular socio-legal contexts. First, I examine the
struggle for low-income community lending in the United States as medi-
ated by the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 and its various amend-
ments.21 Second, I consider the struggle over development lending as
mediated by the World Bank's Inspection Panel.22
These two legal regimes-one domestic, the other international-
were both designed to combat the fact that, contrary to neo-liberal eco-
nomic rhetoric, when economic decisions are sheltered from political
oversight and regulation, capital does not flow efficiently or even ration-
ally. Both legal regimes are efforts to institutionalize procedures that will
increase the participation of affected communities in the decision-making
processes through which capital is allocated. The Community Reinvest-
ment Act is directed at federally regulated banks and savings and loans
institutions, 23 while the Inspection Panel accepts complaints arising out of
World Bank loan practices and development projects. 24
My purpose is not to provide a comprehensive, technocratic account
of these two socio-legal regimes, but rather, to use them as vehicles for
illustrating some general observations about the nature of power; the role
of law in configuring relations of power and marginalization through the
organization of institutional class structures; and the role of these institu-
tional structures in the continued reproduction of racial spaces, both
within and beyond the United States. These general observations, in turn,
are directly relevant to ongoing debates over the contributions that Criti-
cal Race Theory ("CRT"), understood specifically as a practice in the production
of legal theory, can and should be making to the social justice struggles of
various and variously subordinated groups.
There is circulating, in and about the legal academy, an increasingly
popular theory that the production of Critical Race Theory is, at best, only
marginally or indirectly relevant to the struggle for social justice and, at
worst, a self-serving desertion of the front line-a head long plunge into
the greener fields of the legal academy. 25 In this Essay, I engage this the-
20. For a discussion of the kinds of legal interventions that are needed, see
infta notes 80-119 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, see infra
notes 85-100 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the World Bank's Inspection Panel, see infra notes 101-
19 and accompanying text.
23. See Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 170 (1993) (summarizing application of Community Rein-
vestment Act).
24. See Ellen Hey, The World Bank Inspection Panel: Towards the Recognition of a
New Legally Relevant Relationship in International Law, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y SYMP.
61, 72 (1997) (discussing Inspection Panel procedures).
25. See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis ofInstitutions, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1393, 1407-09 (1996) (discussing crit-
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ory by unabashedly mapping out a different theory. Most generally, I chal-
lenge the idea that there is some avenue of agency outside and beyond the
theoretical constructs over which we struggle when we do critical theory.
Indeed, to do critical theory is precisely to struggle over the way we should
understand and hence resist the production of subordination. The strate-
gies we pursue through direct political action, litigation or lobbying are
driven by the way we understand the meaning of subordination, the na-
ture of power and the conditions that enable solidarity and structure indi-
vidual identities, as well as our understandings of the role of law in
producing the material dispossession and institution marginalization that
is experienced as subordination.
Making effective strategic decisions about how to use or not use law in
the struggle for social justice is hard, but it is even harder than we may
realize as we plunge into the front line legal battles. Relations of domina-
tion and marginalization have survived even the most progressive legisla-
tive interventions and litigation victories, in part, because the
decentralization of legal decision-making power across many different ju-
dicial, quasi-judicial, political and quasi-political forums makes it hard to
see, and therefore harder to combat, the cumulative impact of liberal ide-
ology on the legal distribution of power among different groups in differ-
ent social spaces. Read through an institutional-class analysis, an apparent
legal victory in one case can quickly be transformed into a politically re-
gressive defeat in another, depending on the way the legal "victory" tends
to structure institutional power among the competing groups. 2 6 As a re-
sult, the effective use of law requires strategies that can counteract the
rhetorical maneuvers and procedural devices through which liberal legal
interpretation systematically and repeatedly excludes the agency of the op-
pressed from the realm of the lawful. When this exclusion occurs, effec-
tive social transformation comes to depend on the assertion of illegal
agency and the hyper-vulnerability it entails, while social justice and the
hope of lasting change come to depend on the reconstruction of legal
agency. 27 Whatever the response to institutionalized powerlessness and
icism of Critical Race Theory as too abstract and its failure to offer practical solu-
tions to problems of social justice); Robert L. Hayman, Race and Reason: The Assault
on Critical Race Theory About Inequality, 16 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 3-4 (1998) (dealing
with several attacks on Critical Race Theory).
26. I am thinking here of the way the enactment of Title VII must have ap-
peared to the minority union workers whose unions were destroyed and whose
collective power was diluted by the Title VII cases ordering the compulsory merger
of their unions into the larger, all-white unions in which they were to become a
powerless minority. For an extensive analysis of the way decentralized adjudication
disguises the structural violence produced through legal interpretation, see Eliza-
beth M. Iglesias, Structures of Subordination: Women of Color at the Intersection of Title
VII and the NLRA. Not!, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 395, 434-35 (1993) (offering
theoretical framework for understanding legal production of structural violence).
27. See id. (revealing how structural intersections of Title VII and NLRA sup-
press avenues of legal agency available for women of color to lawfully engage in
transformative struggle over terms and conditions of work).
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marginalization, law is clearly implicated in the production of both. This
may make law of limited instrumental value as a tool in the struggle for
social racial justice, but the role of law in institutionalizing relations of
power/lessness makes it a fundamental "stake" in this struggle.
Put differently, while law won't change the world, any emancipatory
movement must seek ultimately to change the law, and to do so it will
need theory. This is because all action is embedded in a theory, and, even
more importantly, in a structure that is itself embedded in and organized
by theory. Just as neo-liberal institutional class structures are organized
through the articulation of neo-liberal theories in legal doctrine, the insti-
tutionalization of a new order of power and knowledge will depend, at
least in part, on further dissemination of the kinds of ideas RaceCrit and
LatCrit scholars have only just begun to address. It will depend, above all,
on a vision of social justice that engages, rather than ignores, the interna-
tional dimensions of racial subordination, the centrality of poverty in the
subordination of peoples of color throughout the world, and the role of
law in dis/organizing the intra- and inter-group solidarities that are so cen-
tral to effective collective action in any institutional context.2 8
II. BETWEEN STRUCTURE AND AGENCY- INSTITUTIONALIZED
POWERLESSNESS AND THE OTHER PATH
In The Other Path, Hernando De Soto provided a vivid, though funda-
mentally romanticized, account of the informal economy in Peru. While
the dominant narratives of the 1980s represented the informal economy
as a black market populated by tax evading free riders, De Soto introduced
the idea that black marketers were among the most dynamic agents of
economic and social development in Peru, at least in the four economic
sectors studied by the Institute. Focusing on business, manufacturing,
housing and transportation, De Soto argued that the informal economy
had evolved, in large part, because the Peruvian legal system was too com-
plex, corrupt and restricted to function as an effective framework for regu-
lating the activities of Peru's impoverished majority. 29 For many
Peruvians, working, investing and other forms of collective action organ-
28. These three themes have been central in the emergent body of LatCrit
scholarship, which reflects a concerted, collective project "to reinvigorate the an-
tisubordination agenda of Critical Race Theory, revive its ethical aspirations, and
expand its substantive scope." Iglesias, supra note 9, at 177-78. For more extensive
accounts of the way LatCrit theory is re-imagining the parameters of Critical Race
Theory along multiple dimensions, see Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Out of the Shadows:
Marking Intersections In and Between Asian Pacific American Critical Legal Scholarship
and Latina/o Critical Legal Theory, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 349, 349 (1998); Eliza-
beth M. Iglesias, Identity, Democracy, Communicative Power, Inter/National Labor Rights
and Evolution of LatCrit Theory and Community, 53 U. MtAMi L. REv. 575 (1999);
Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in
Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas,
19 CHICANo-LATINO L. REv. 503 (1998).
29. See generally The Other Path, supra note 13.
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ized outside the legal system have often been the only way to survive; but
as De Soto emphasized, the costs of "informality"- the costs of having to
operate illegally-are substantial. Informal trade, transport businesses,
manufacturing enterprises and the illegal settlements established through
violent and/or incremental land invasions were then, and still are, pro-
foundly vulnerable. This vulnerability condemns "informals" to a life of
uncertainty, instability and fear of extortion, imprisonment, physical at-
tacks, and most significantly, to the possibility that their operations will be
shut down, they and their families will be evicted, and their life's work and
investments will be lost.
30
De Soto's account of the plight of Peruvian informals provides a use-
ful point of reference for achieving two different, but related, objectives.
The first objective is to show how Critical Race Theory can best contribute
to the struggle for social racial justice. De Soto's study of the informal
economy in Peru illustrates the limitations of political strategies that di-
chotomize theory and praxis and glorify the mobilization of collective ac-
tion as the model of transformative agency. The instances of collective
action he depicts are compelling, transformative in certain respects, and
even heroic at times, but they are hardly emancipatory. Indeed, De Soto's
study is a vivid illustration of the disjuncture between intention and effec-
tive agency, which makes the theoretical analysis of power-its nature,
structures and modalities-a crucial prerequisite in designing effective
strategies for direct collective action or in determining which of the many
different litigation struggles or lobbying efforts should claim our energies
and attention. De Soto's account also advances my second and more spe-
cific objective of analyzing the way law participates in the production of
racial spaces within and across the territorial boundaries of the nation-
state.
The title of the book, The OtherPath, is a play on words by reference to
Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path. The Shining Path, a Peruvian guerilla
movement was founded in 1970; by the 1990s, the movement had become
one of the most violent insurgencies still active in Latin America.3 ' As the
title suggests, De Soto's book, based on studies conducted in the early
1980s (before the disorganization and eventual demise of the Soviet "evil
empire") promised an alternative to the many different avenues through
which the oppressed and impoverished of Peru might otherwise seek to
improve their lives: an alternative to an Indian revolt to restore the Incan
empire; to international communism; to export driven development (par-
ticularly of the coca plant variety); and alternatively, even to the commu-
nity-based movements inspired by liberation theology.3 2
30. See id. at 171-72 (analyzing informal housing, trade and transportation in
Peru and "costs" of such informalities).
31. See THE PERU READER: HISTORY, CuuruRE, POLITIcS 305-07 (Orin Starn et
al. eds., Duke U. Press 1995) (giving account of contradictory theories regarding
The Shining Path).
32. See generally THE OTHER PATH, supra note 13 (discussing alternative path).
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Perhaps for these reasons, De Soto's book on the survival strategies
pursued by the poorest of the Peruvian poor was received with the unusual
interest and enthusiastic endorsement of neo-liberal conservatives who
were then uniting around an all-out campaign to tax the pampered poor
and redistribute to the needy rich. 33 In those heady days of unrestricted
corporate greed, The Other Path was so well received that it prompted
praise from then-President Ronald Reagan, who, in his 1987 address to the
United Nations General Assembly, said:
The scholar, Hernando De Soto, and his colleagues have... de-
scribed an economy of the poor that bypasses crushing taxation
and stifling regulation .... [B]y becoming underground entre-
preneurs themselves, or by working for them, the poor have be-
come less poor and the nation itself richer .... The free market
is the other path to development and the one true path. It is the
peoples' path. And, unlike other paths, it leads somewhere. It
works.
34
The question, of course, is why a book about the coping strategies of
the poorest of the Peruvian poor would generate such interest and inspire
33. When I presented an earlier version of this paper at the CRT conference
at Yale in October of 1997, my friend Enrique Carrasco took issue with my use of
the term "neo-liberal conservatives," by asking me whether there was such a thing
as a "neo-liberal radical." I answered that indeed there is such a thing: "The neo-
liberal radical is, in effect, a communist." Embedded in both his question and my
answer is the paradox of the way ideologies converge at their extremities. Ironi-
cally, a careful reading of Marx's The German Ideology might lead anyone with half
an open mind to conclude that the future projected by today's neo-liberal boosters
is none other than "the final stage of communism" projected by Marx-that is, a
neo-liberal paradise of flexible production and the unrestricted circulation of
goods, capital and labor-where the whithering away of the state produces a post-
modem paradise of personal freedom. According to Marx:
[I] n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activ-
ity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society
regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do
one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in
the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I
have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or
critic.
MARX AND ENGELS READER, supra note 2, at 124.
34. Winn, supra note 14, at 899 n.1 (quoting President Ronald Reagan, Ad-
dress to United Nations General Assembly, New York, New York (Sept. 21, 1987)).
Like his predecessor, President George Bush was also much impressed. Address-
ing the annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
in September of 1989, Bush referred to De Soto's work:
De Soto's great contribution has been to point out what, in retrospect,
may seem obvious: people everywhere want the same things .... De
Soto's prescription offers a clear and promising alternative to economic
stagnation in Latin America and other parts of the world. Government
must bring the "informal" workers into the regular economy-and then
get out of the way, and let individual enterprise flourish.




such a warm embrace from the high priest of United States imperialism
and global capitalism. The answer is easy. The book has been popular
among neo-liberal conservatives because it provided a simple analysis of
the problem of poverty and a simple solution that just happened to coin-
cide with what global capitalists still want to believe: the best way to deal
with the problems of the poor is to establish effective legal structures for
the recognition and enforcement of property rights and contractual agree-
ments, and then let the free market run its course. 35
I want to focus initially on one of the studies through which De Soto
purports to demonstrate this point.3 6 The purpose of the study was to
"explain why some people prefer formality and others informality." 37 This
led the ILD researchers to conduct a series of inquiries. First, they talked
directly to informal workers. These workers complained that the legal
procedures required to formalize their economic activities were prohibi-
tively costly and complex. 38 This, in turn, inspired the ILD to conduct a
simulation in order to measure the costs of access to legality.
39
In the summer of 1983, a team of ILD researchers set up a small gar-
ment factory in an industrial area on the outskirts of Lima, organizing it as
a sole proprietorship. 40 To establish this business, they rented a factory
building, installed garment machinery and recruited four university stu-
dents to go through the legal procedures required to formalize the busi-
ness.4 1 The study was designed to be representative of the situation faced
by ordinary Peruvians. 42 Accordingly, formalizing the simulated garment
factory required going through approximately sixty percent of the bureau-
cratic procedures common to all industries and ninety percent of the pro-
cedures required of non-incorporated sole proprietorships. 43  The
students were also instructed to handle the bureaucratic "red tape" with-
35. See THE OTHER PATH, supra note 13, at 244-45 (arguing in favor of free
market).
36. See id. at 132-34 (describing simulation conducted to test efficiency of le-
gal structures in Peru by trying to organize proprietorship using existing legal
venues).
37. See id. at 132.
38. See id. at 132-33 (conducting initial circumstantial comparison between
reactions of informal and formal workers to accessibility of existing legal
structures).
39. See id. at 134-35 (graphing various costs of access).
40. See id. at 133 (explaining basic mechanics of simulated business).
41. See id. (describing procedure followed by author and research assistants to
test their hypothesis regarding relationship between accessibility of existing legal
structures in Peru and immobility of poverty-stricken people).
42. See id. at 135 (providing graph of average length of time needed for vari-
ous procedures required in formalizing business). The purpose and outcome of
these procedures was to acquire some required license, certificate or registration.
See id.
43. See id. at 133 (choosing textiles as industry for simulation because it was
"widespread in Peru and thus culturally significant, the activity chosen for the sim-
ulation was also highly representative").
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out the assistance of intermediaries, and to pay bribes only when necessary
to continue the simulation. 44
The results of the study are instructive. It took 289 full time days of
work for the four university students to acquire the eleven permits needed
to complete the simulation.4 5 Two of the ten solicited bribes had to be
paid.46 The total costs in actual expenses, wasted time and lost profits
were estimated at $1,231, or thirty-two times the minimum monthly wage
in Peru at that time.47 Perhaps most interestingly, De Soto repeated the
simulation in Tampa, Florida, where the procedures to achieve the same
result reportedly took only three and one-half hours.48
This study is interesting both on its own terms and in terms of the
conclusions De Soto and other neo-liberal conservatives draw from it. On
its own terms, the study has lessons for us about the nature of power, the
role of law in producing and disorganizing power, and the relationship
between structure and agency in the struggle for social justice. In fact, I
want to focus more precisely on the nature of the agency that Peruvian
informals exercised in and around the social, legal and political structures
revealed by De Soto's analysis. This focus will underscore a point that
many already know, but too often seem to forget in the debate over the
relative priority of theory or praxis in the struggle for justice. Clearly, Pe-
ruvian informals expended enormous amounts of time, energy and re-
sources in pursuing their objectives. It is equally clear from De Soto's two
simulations that legal structures determined whether those efforts would
take 289 days or three and one-half hours to achieve their objectives. The
point is this: the more effort something takes, the less power one has.
From this perspective, the fact that Peruvian peasants established their in-
formal settlements in and around Lima through the direct collective ac-
tion of both gradual and violent land invasions, or that the Community
Reinvestment Movement negotiated a series of community development
loans after mobilizing massive protests in the credit-starved communities
of the United States, are evidence more of the powerlessness and
marginalization of these communities than evidence of their power.
In order to understand this point, it is important to understand that
agency is not the same thing as power. Effective power is best understood
as a function of the routine relationships between human agency and the
institutional structures in which that power is exercised. Collective politi-
cal mobilization-the demonstrations in the streets-can be represented
and experienced both as occurring outside dominant institutional ar-
rangements and as transforming inherited political identities. However,
the raw power needed to achieve one's ends or protect one's interest
44. See id. at 134.
45. See id. at 133-35.
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 133.
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through the extraordinary efforts involved in mobilizing and maintaining
broad based social movements and political coalitions can hardly be
equated with the power that rests on the legally sanctioned institutional-
ized authority to effectuate these objectives through the routine practices
and procedures of existing institutions. 49
Therefore, the struggle against subordination must be understood as
a struggle for power within the institutional arrangements through which
power is legally organized and deployed. This in turn means that the anti-
subordination objectives at the heart of CRT depend on reorganizing
these institutional structures, reforming the legal doctrines that construct
them and reconstructing the order of knowledge that informs and legiti-
mates these doctrines, as much as they depend on the mobilization of col-
lective action. This is particularly true given the extent to which direct
action is constrained by the structural contexts within which it is always/
already located-at least until "the revolution." Even then, the structural
arrangements of the past tend to have an uncanny hold on the possibilities
of the future. To the extent that the role of law in perpetuating these
structures is neither immediately obvious, nor easily confronted, com-
bated or transformed, CRT can make a significant contribution by helping
us understand how relations of power/lessness are institutionalized in and
through different legal regimes; by helping us locate and assess the institu-
tional positions that subordinated people(s) tend to occupy in these legal
regimes; and by helping us determine how best to restructure these insti-
tutional arrangements in light of what we have learned about the ways in
which identity-politics can enable or disable the solidarities and alliances
needed to combat subordination in these institutional contexts.
More concretely, my point is this: case studies of Peruvian land inva-
sions are compelling reminders that direct collective action does not re-
write laws nor does it reorganize oppressive institutions. Although activists
may cherish the notion that other agents will be inspired (or compelled)
to rewrite the laws and reorganize these institutions, collective action does
not guarantee that these agents will have the political will to complete the
task, particularly in the face of new and evolving obstacles. Collective ac-
tion also does not ensure that anyone will have the ability to conceptualize,
or the technical resources or "know-how" to effectuate, emancipatory insti-
tutional transformation for the long run. 50
49. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Institutionalizing Economic Justice: A LatCrit
Perspective on the Imperatives of Linking the Reconstruction of "Community" to the Transfor-
mation of Legal Structures that Institutionalize the Depoliticization and Fragmentation of
Labor/Community Solidarity, 2 U. PENN. J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 773, 797-99 (2000) (urg-
ing that regime's legitimacy is not measured by fact that justice can be achieved
through extraordinary efforts and agency of otherwise marginalized persons, but
rather by extent to which regime enables achievement ofjustice on a routine basis).
50. See, e.g., Alan Mabin, On the Problems and Prospects of Overcoming Segregation
and Fragmentation in Southern Africa's Cities in the Postmodern Era, in POST MODERN
CITIES AND SPACES (Sophie Watson & Katherine Gibson eds., 1995).
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Reports from South Africa provide another instructive example be-
cause they provide a window into the kind of reality that collective mobili-
zation has often confronted "after the revolution." Alan Mabin reports
that when South African community-based organizations (otherwise
known as the "civics") and government officials began their negotiations
in 1989 to dismantle the urban structures constructed over decades of
apartheid and colonialism, "all the creative thinking seemed to come from
the civic side."5 1 The negotiations began in the context of a state of emer-
gency. The civics successfully organized massive boycotts of rents on pub-
lic housing and service charges in the townships. 5 2 When the civics
succeeded in expanding the scope of negotiations from issues related to
ending the boycotts to the nature, structure and operation of local govern-
ment, "[fi]t seemed that this emancipatory movement, which sought to re-
present the township masses, stood at the point of taking power at the
local level from existing authorities."5 3 But, by all accounts, they failed.
The question is why?
The first explanation is easy: the people who mobilized in the streets
were completely unprepared, either for the vicious brutality their political
achievements would unleash, or for the routine processes, endless meet-
ings and technocratic negotiations through which the struggle for anti-
racist democratic reform would move out of the streets and into the bu-
reaucratic offices of state power.54 Although grassroots mobilization did
achieve significant political victories, by the 1990s, "the civics ... [were]
fragmented, weak and no longer [had] the same popular support. They
[were] weakened by the whole process of national negotiations and, above
all, by the terror unleashed in the townships through Inkatha."55
The second explanation for the civics' failure to consolidate and insti-
tutionalize their power focuses on the crisis of political vision reflected in
the news reports from South Africa: "ANC PLEDGES FISCAL DISCI-
PLINE."56 In the new South Africa, The Freedom Charter gave way to
supply-side economics, and the commitment to economic "Growth
Through Redistribution" gave way to the political economy of structural
adjustment. This meant no significant new taxes. Exchange controls were
to be phased out, and free trade phased in.5 7
51. Id. at 188.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 189-90 (noting that ordinary people mobilizing in and through
"civics" were unprepared for violence or for bureaucratic politics).
55. Laurence Harris, The Political Economy of Reform in South Africa, in MARxIsM
IN THE POST MODERN AGE: CONFRONTING THE NEW WORLD ORDER 315 (Antonio
Callari et al. eds., 1995).
56. Id.
57. See id. at 316 (explaining that economic agenda initially embraced within
COSATU, SACP and ANC, and referred to by slogan "Growth Through Redistribu-
tion," emphasized that "the state should take a strong role in redistributing income
and wealth toward the masses, simultaneously developing domestic industry's pro-
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The devolution of the emancipatory project in South Africa clearly
illustrates the more general point that the power to say "no" to oppression
does not automatically translate into the power to create a reality to which
we can say "yes." 58 Indeed, even the power to effect fundamental and rad-
ical change does not automatically translate into the ability to conceptual-
ize the institutional arrangements that can sustain the values and
objectives of emancipation. Without institutional transformation, every-
thing directly done can be indirectly undone. Without conceptual evolu-
tion informed by a critical understanding of the way new processes, like
flexible production, globalization and the proliferation of political identi-
ties can affect relations of subordination, the struggle for emancipatory
social transformation may end up solving the problems of the past and
leaving the new processes of subordination intact. This is precisely be-
cause the problems of development are the problems of institutionalizing
an alternative order of knowledge and power. These problems, being
both structural and conceptual, require the kind of structural and concep-
tual reforms that are generated only in and through the production of
theory.
If the goal is to eliminate subordination, it is not enough to glorify the
fact that human agency can transcend its context or that mass political
coalitions can achieve transformative objectives such as destabilizing a ra-
cist regime or blocking the merger of a banking institution that has failed
to invest in low-income communities. At some point, the claims advo-
cated, and the interests represented, by any mass social political move-
ment must be translated into new institutional structures through which
currently subordinated groups can effectively assert their interests on a
routine basis without having to engage forever in the extraordinary efforts
of mass mobilization. The institutionalization of a new order of power and
knowledge, however, does not follow automatically from mass mobiliza-
tion. Rather, it requires legal reform interventions, informed by the kind
of theoretical work that enables critical analysis of the way legally con-
duction to meet the demand for increased living standards, and essentially grow-
ing on the basis of the domestic market, while seeking simultaneously to increase
the competitiveness of export industries"). This prescription should be familiar to
Latin American development economists, as well as to LatCrit scholars. See gener-
ally Enrique R. Carrasco, Opposition, Justice, Structuralism, and Particularity: Intersec-
tions Between LatCrit Theory and Law and Development Studies, 28 U. Mimii INTER-AM.
L. REV. 313 (1996-97) (taking critical perspective on failure of radical development
economics to achieve any meaningful transformation in Latin America). But see
Iglesias, supra note 9, at 200 n.24 (suggesting alternative reasons for this failure).
In either event, Growth Through Redistribution promotes an agenda distinct from
both the right-wing trickle-down alternative of "growth and redistribution," as well
as the World Bank's approach focusing on "growth with distribution." See id.
58. See, e.g., Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Rape, Race and Representation: The Power of
Discourse, Discourses of Power and the Reconstruction of Heterosexuality, 49 VAND. L. REv.
869, 929-43 n.174 (1996) (exploring problem of designing effective legal strategies
for eliminating rape in absence of positive substantive vision of what heterosexual
autonomy means to women).
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structed institutional arrangements organize authority and allocate power
across the different classes and political identities, which interact in and
through, and indeed are often constituted by, these institutions.
When I think about the South African civics trying to dismantle
apartheid under new conditions of increasing suburbanization and flexi-
ble production, or the Peruvian informal workers trying to etch out a mini-
mal existence despite, and in the shadow of, the regulatory and
bureaucratic legal obstacles that construct them as illegals, I am increas-
ingly convinced that the struggle for social justice is profoundly in need of
a theory about the way to formulate legal theory. The struggle for social
justice needs this theory as much as it needs the mobilization of collective
action or the production of legal scholarship aimed at generating new
doctrinal formulations for ongoing litigation. Critical analysis of the role
of law in the disorganization of institutional structures is all the more
pressing because the call to agency under conditions of institutionalized
powerlessness is a call to perpetual marginality in a war without end.
As the examples of the Peruvian informals and the South African civ-
ics illustrate, direct collective action may, and has in the past, achieved
some momentary advances. Nevertheless, these examples also suggest the
degree to which any emancipatory achievements will remain profoundly
unstable until the legally constructed institutions of white supremacy and
the anti-democratic institutions of the anti-political economy are replaced
with a new order of knowledge and power. 59 In this theory about how to
do theory that I am imagining and deploying in this Essay, there are three
crucial tasks for Critical Race Theory. The first task is to develop a com-
pelling account of the way law constructs institutional class structures. Sec-
ond, it must reveal the way these institutional structures demobilize and
disorganize the collective political identities through which subordinated
groups might otherwise seek to transform the political economy-for ex-
ample, as community members, consumers, workers, racial minorities or
welfare recipients. Third, Critical Race Theory needs to imagine the kinds
of institutional arrangements that should replace them.
Focusing more specifically on the role of law in the production of
racial spaces, the first task is to identify the institutional arrangements
through which racial spaces are produced. These spaces are artifacts of
dis/investment decisions made as much by private economic actors like
banks and business corporations, as by government officials. Often these
decisions have been made without the knowledge, and even over the vio-
lent objections, of affected communities.60 The ability, the power, to make
59. See Iglesias, supra note 26, at 395-96 (locating legal production of struc-
tural violence in interpretative manipulation of fundamental conceptual structures
like individual/collective rights dichotomy, special interests/common good and
group membership as prerequisite of representational authority).
60. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 49 (exploring broader implications of labor
and community struggles for voice in corporate employment practices and partici-
pation in processes of community development).
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these decisions, even in the face of sustained and organized community
opposition, exists precisely because of the relations of power/lessness that
are institutionalized through the legal doctrines that effectuate and legiti-
mize hierarchical, non-participatory and exclusionary allocations of deci-
sional authority. This includes legal doctrines like the business judgment
rule and prohibitions on compulsory credit allocation, as well as restric-
tions on shareholder democracy, minority business set-asides and state reg-
ulations limiting corporate political expenditures. In each of these
instances, the legal doctrines and constitutional interpretations through
which these legal rules are articulated are themselves the interpretative
spaces in which the democratization of power-whether economic or po-
litical-is systematically suppressed through the rhetorical manipulation
of the economic/political dichotomy.6
1
Thus, on its own terms, De Soto's study of the obstacles that informal
workers confront in attempting to legalize their economic activities re-
minds me of the need for critical theory that attacks the institutionaliza-
tion of subordination and the conceptual order that sustains it, even as it
engages the more difficult task of imagining and articulating an alterna-
tive institutional order. But De Soto's simulation offers other lessons
when we focus more specifically on the way this simulation has been used
by neo-liberal conservatives to "name the problem" and "prescribe a
solution."
Neo-liberal conservatives also draw a lesson about human agency
from De Soto's simulation and the structural constraints it reveals. It is a
lesson about the power of human agency to transcend and transform the
conditions of subordination of a life of poverty. The lesson they draw is
that the human spirit is cross-culturally driven by a desire to achieve, and
that poor people would achieve if only the government would get out of
the way.62 This is, of course, a meaningful conclusion to draw when the
problems of the poor are presented as a consequence of a regulatory bu-
reaucracy that suppresses the entrepreneurial human spirit.63 What else
61. See generally Iglesias, supra note 8 (mapping structures of institutionalized
power/lessness through doctrinal deconstruction of economic/political
dichotomy).
62. Llosa noted:
The findings of The Other Path challenge those who assert that Latin
American culture, particularly the Indian and mestizo traditions, is in-
compatible with the entrepreneurial spirit and the democratic and eco-
nomic systems of the more economically advanced nations of the world.
Contrary to this preconception, ILD research has found that informals
maintain private regimes through extralegal norms that they have cre-
ated, and that these norms allow for healthy competition in which con-
tractual rights are enforced.
Llosa, supra note 17, at xxiv.
63. See id. at xxvi ("The ILD has looked at the actual experience in Peru and
has found that it is not the elimination of the entrepreneurial class that the poor
want. On the contrary, they want the state to remove the obstacles that it has
constructed that handicap their entrepreneurial efforts.").
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can be expected when the state oppresses the market and political power
interferes with economic freedom?
Clearly there is something wrong when compliance with the law
makes effective agency functionally impossible for all but a few deter-
mined individuals with the resources and stamina to persevere. There is
something wrong when non-compliance reduces the vast majority to a
state of vulnerability and insecurity so profound that every operation be-
comes a fly-by-night endeavor. But this situation is not unique to Peru.
On the contrary, in the United States the hyper-regulation of the poor has
all but guaranteed that people in public housing will never start their own
businesses. Lease provisions on public housing have routinely prohibited
efforts to generate income at home, so "residents must either covertly con-
duct business out of their apartments or forbear from doing business at
all." 6
4
The real puzzle is this: Why is it that the neo-liberal conservative's
response to De Soto's account of the plight of the Peruvian informals does
not dismiss the informals as the ones who simply didn't try hard enough?
After all, everyone confronts obstacles, every action has its costs and some
businesses have managed to overcome the obstacles to legality. Since
when have obstacles been anything but a reason to try harder? Could it be
that neo-liberal conservatives have at last discovered the extent to which
the ideology of the entrepreneurial self-made, lift him/self up by the he-
man bootstraps ignores fundamental aspects of the reality of poverty, the
lack of resources and options that characterize racial spaces, and the inse-
curity and immobility that condemn such a large majority to the repetition
of-over and over-redoing that which they have already done? And why
should anyone ever have to work that hard to survive? Could it be that the
neo-liberal mind has at last registered the claim that hard work is not the
answer to the problems of people whose hard work leaves them exhausted
and (still) impoverished?
Not so fast. Such conclusions go beyond anything the neo-liberal can
or would endorse. For the neo-liberal, the conclusions to be drawn are
much narrower and more targeted. De Soto's account earns their en-
dorsement because it foregrounds government irrationality. Free the mar-
ket, and there will be no racial spaces. "Free market" capitalism is the
solution to, not the cause of, the informal economy. It is the solution to,
not the cause of, racial subordination.
I want to offer a different account of the neo-liberal political econ-
omy-one that locates the production of racial spaces at the intersection
of two apparently mutually incompatible "market" processes-and to sug-
gest that the simple expedient of deregulating the over-regulated does not
even remotely begin to address the profound impact of these two
64. Margaret Beebe Held, Developing Micro-Businesses in Public Housing: Notes
from the Field, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 473, 481 (1996) (describing effects of lease
provisions in public housing).
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processes on the reproduction of the poverty and racism that construct
racial spaces. These processes are "the rock and the hard place" of market
globalization and segmentation, and minority communities are caught
right between them in their struggle for access to, and control over, the
distribution of finance capital.
First, the idea that deregulation will liberate the poor ignores the dif-
ferential access to capital that is being accelerated through the process of
financial integration and the globalization of capital markets. In a deregu-
lated global capital market, every credit application competes with every
other credit application. 6 5 This means that potential homeowners in the
inner cities of the United States compete for loans with the Hunt brothers
in their efforts to corner the silver market, 66 and the speculative self-en-
richment schemes of the latest wave of (Savings & Loan) robber barons.6 7
In a deregulated market, these competing credit applications are not as-
sessed in terms of their contributions to community development or even
to the establishment of profitable economic activity. Instead, they are
compared in terms of their profit maximization forfinance capital.68 Put
differently, even profitable economic activity can be starved for capital be-
cause investment in profitable activity is not the same as profit maximiza-
tion. This is not new to the free market system. What is new is that the
globalization of capital markets enables the law of greed to go global. All
the world's a portfolio. The de-territorialization of investment has acceler-
ated the processes of dis/investment that are producing racial spaces, as
finance capital abandons economic redevelopment in search of hyper-
profits in the hyper-spaces of finance capital beyond the territorial bound-
aries of any particular community or nation. 69 This also applies to Third
World capital as evidenced in Third World capital flight. What's good for
65. See, e.g., JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIESCHNICK, CREDIT WHERE
IT'S DUE: DEVELOPMENT BANKING FOR COMMUNITIES 47 (1992).
Today, the great majority of business lending is done by financial in-
termediaries that have formal methods to compare the local business
loan to finance inventory with a loan to finance the latest mega merger,
or a loan to finance construction of a power plant in Brazil, or a loan to
finance the purchase of mortgages made in a distant state. Increasingly,
every investment is compared to every other investment on the basis of
risk, return and liquidity and priced accordingly.
Id.
66. See WILLIAM GREIDER, SECRETS OF THE TEMPLE: How THE FEDERAL RESERVE
RUNS THE COUNTRY 144-45, 189-90 (1987) (recounting how in early 1980s, "free-
market" decisions of U.S. banks and brokerages led to their participation in financ-
ing Nelso and Hunt's outrageous conspiracy to monopolize world silver markets).
67. See generally MARTIN MAYER, THE GREATEST-EVER BANK ROBBERY- THE COL,
LAPSE OF THE SAVINGS AND LOAN INDUSTRY (1990) (recounting consequences of
deregulation on Savings and Loan Industry).
68. See GREIDER, supra note 66, at 135-37 (discussing generally how profit max-
imization concepts disfavor lower economic class members when interest rates are
increased by Federal Reserve to dissuade borrowing based on credit).
69. See generally JOHN R. DOMINGUEZ, CAPITAL FLOWS IN MINORITY AREAS 22
(1976) (discussing de-territorialization concepts in minority communities).
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the First World gander is good for the Third World goose. If it's more
profitable to invest in foreign denominated financial instruments than in
real economic activity, then who's to blame for underdevelopment?70
Ironically, poor and minority communities are also starved for capital
because of market segmentation. Minority businesses operating in minor-
ity communities report that profitable business ventures are starved for
capital, but not because the businesses cannot offer above-market interest
rates.71 In fact, minority businesses routinely have to offer above-market
rates to obtain the few loans they do get outside government protected
credit programs. 72 The problem is not price per se, but the fact that minor-
ity businesses often cannot get private commercial loans at any price. 73 If
minority businessmen in the United States have such a hard time getting
the credit they need to access the free market, why would anyone believe
that Peruvian informals would have access to the credit they need once the
solution of deregulation is implemented?74 Indeed, market segmentation
is at least as pervasive and more flagrantly institutionalized in Latin
America capital markets where domestic banks have gorged on enormous
profits by manipulating differentials in international and domestic interest
rates and by trading on the fact that small companies have much less ac-
cess to foreign lenders and investment bankers than large companies in a
few privileged sectors (like the automobile and pharmaceuticals sec-
tors). 75 Like minority businesses in the United States, though for differ-
70. See generally SYLVtA MAXFIELD, GovERNING CAPITAL: INTERNATIONAL Fi-
NANCE AND MEXICAN POLITICS (1990) (discussing economic globalization and its
resulting flight of capital from Mexico).
71. See DOMINGUEZ, supra note 69, at 19 (stating that lack of capital in minor-
ity communities results from reluctance of financial institutions to make loans in
inner cities, as opposed to interest rate levels).
72. See id. at 31-33 (noting that minority businesses pay more to meet their
credit needs even when credit is available outside of minority credit institutions).
73. See id. at 19 (discussing "inelastic demands" in minority community capital
flow). Studying the flow of capital in minority communities, Dominguez makes
the following observations about the role of "price" in the allocation of capital:
A statistical survey of minority businessmen was conducted in which the
businessmen were asked to list the factors that determined whether or
not they received investment funds from lending institutions. Most re-
spondents placed little emphasis upon the cost of borrowing, since they
normally expected to pay higher rates of interest than borrowers outside
the inner city, and since changes in the rate of interest did not affect the
availability of capital. Also, most of the businessmen stated that their ex-
pected returns for a given venture were usually substantially above the
negotiated rate of interest. The principle problem they identified was the
acquisition of funds from financial institutions that were generally reluc-
tant to make loans in the ghetto-not the level of interest rates.
Id.
74. See Winn, supra note 14, at 911-20 (providing economic analysis of situa-
tion of Peruvian informals after deregulation).
75. See Sylvia Maxfield, National Business, Debt-Led Growth and Political Transi-
tion in Latin America, in DEBT AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 78-80 (Barbara
Stallings & Robert Kaufman eds., 1989) (discussing "short term financial binge"
for Latin American financiers benefiting big business such as pharmaceutical and
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ent reasons and through different mechanisms, small- and medium-sized
businesses in Latin America have found domestic credit "exceptionally ex-
pensive," and foreign credit inaccessible at any price.
76
But certainly capital markets cannot be both integrated and global
and, at the same time, racially segmented and compartmentalized. This
apparent contradiction is inexplicable in neo-liberal economic theory be-
cause it can only be understood if one is willing to consider the possibility
that the flow of capital is embedded in a broader cultural phenomenon of
racial discrimination, and that institutions (other than the state) are also
implicated in the production of economic marginalization and poverty.
The idea that the free market operates in the shadow of racial discrimina-
tion, both through the exercise of individualized discretion and institu-
tionalized decision-criteria, is a notion that neo-liberal ideology refuses to
internalize in its theoretical constructs.
In the United States, discrimination in the flow of finance capital,
through practices of redlining minority communities and the denial of
capital to minority entrepreneurs, has been a primary factor in the pro-
duction of racial spaces. Dis/investment, coupled with the containment
practices of racial segregation, convert minority communities into ghettos.
In the Third World, the production of racial spaces has been affected
through development projects that rip people out of their traditional so-
cial relations of production and exchange. This is done both directly, by
financing involuntary resettlements, and indirectly, through finance prac-
tices that privilege major industries over micro-businesses and export sec-
tors over domestic sectors.
77
From this perspective, to suggest that simply freeing the en-
trepreneurial human spirit from the regulatory squeeze will eliminate pov-
erty is to ignore the role of so-called "private" institutions of capitalism,
such as banks and corporations, in the production of racial spaces. It also
auto industries, and how Mexican financiers manipulated domestic and interna-
tional interest rates for profit).
76. See id. at 80 (discussing burdensome prices of domestic credit for small
and medium-sized businesses and their inaccessibility to international loans).
77. See Gregory D. Squires, Community Reinvestment: An Emerging Social Move-
ment, in FROM REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT: COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO URBAN DE-
VELOPMENT 3 (Gregory D. Squires ed., 1992) (discussing how Post-World War II
racially motivated mortgage practices resulted in increased minority occupied cen-
tral cities); see also Maxfield, supra note 75, at 80 (discussing Latin American finan-
cial practices that favored major businesses with access to foreign financial
markets, while small- and medium-sized businesses with no such access remained
disadvantaged). This disproportionate access to foreign financial markets, result-
ing from Latin American domestic financial practices, injured the position of the
working class. See Ian Roxborough, Organized Labor: A Major Victim of Debt Crisis, in
DEBT AND DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 75, at 91 (noting that labor
force in Latin America has been injured by Latin American financial situation).
The author states: "The general picture has been one of unrelieved gloom. Across
the continent, wages and unemployment have dropped, often sharply, as the costs
of adjustment have fallen on the poorer sections of the population." Id.
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ignores the role of law in enabling institutionally dominant classes to make
decisions that produce these results, even over the many legal challenges
and sometimes-violent opposition of affected individuals and communi-
ties. Thus, while De Soto is most certainly on the right track in targeting
law and legally constructed institutional arrangements as fundamental fac-
tors in the production of poverty, his institutional-class analysis is simplistic
and incomplete in two critical and inter-related respects. First, it presup-
poses the points it purports to demonstrate: namely the superiority of a
neo-liberal social order organized around the strategically manipulated
separation of economic and political social spaces and processes. Second,
while De Soto makes a compelling case that differential access to legality
produces a new class structure of institutionally mediated hierarchies and
antagonisms, he fails to perform an institutional-class analysis of the pri-
vate institutions that tend to dominate in deregulated economic spaces.
This omission may be consistent with the neo-liberal biases of his theory,
but not with any purported objective of revealing the causes and solutions
to the problem of poverty.
In the next part I want to illustrate how a more critical institutional-
class analysis could enrich Critical Race Theory by (1) increasing our un-
derstanding of the role of law in the production of subordination, (2)
enabling us to see the difference between legal reforms that create new
causes of action and reforms that reorganize the distribution of institu-
tional power, 78 and (3) contextualizing our analysis of identity politics and
the formation of political identities within an analysis of the way in which
the legal organization of institutional classes channels and constrains the
political aspirations and collective solidarities needed for progressive
change in particular institutional contexts.
Like De Soto, my institutional-class analysis seeks to replace Marxist
class categories with an analysis of the way relations of privilege and
marginalization are legally constructed. Unlike De Soto, however, I do
not presuppose, but rather, critically analyze the separation of economics
and politics-in fact and in fiction. 79 Moreover, my institutional-class
analysis focuses more comprehensively on the way power is organized by
legal institutions, and how legal institutions are organized by the interpre-
tative manipulation of legal doctrines and categories. Thus, in analyzing
how law participates in the production of poverty and the racialization of
78. See Iglesias, supra note 26, at 420-25 (contrasting relative impacts on mi-
nority interests between transformative potential of legal strategies aimed at re-
forming substantive elements defining fair representation and anti-discrimination
in labor statutes such as NLRA and Title VII, with legal strategies aimed at reorga-
nizing institutional arrangements of majoritarian power that currently structure
processes of collective bargaining).
79. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Structural Violence: Law and the Antipolitical
Economy (forthcoming) (mapping strategic manipulation of separation and inter-
penetration of politics and economics across various regulatory frameworks and




spaces, I focus specifically on (1) the way the decision-making power over
the allocation of capital is legally institutionalized, (2) the order of knowl-
edge that rationalizes and legitimizes these institutional structures in legal
discourse, and (3) the way these institutional structures organize relations
of powerlessness among the various groups affected by capital allocation
decisions emerging from these institutions.
III. BEYOND THE OTHER PATH: AN INSTITUTIONAL-CLASS ANALYSIS OF
THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT AND THE WORLD BANK
INSPECTION PANEL
The U.S. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 ("CRA") and the
World Bank Inspection Panel ("Panel" or "Inspection Panel") are prod-
ucts of collective political and legal struggles to gain some control over the
capital allocation and investment decisions that have so seriously affected
poor communities both in the United States and throughout the world 0
In the United States, the CRA represents an early, but still controversial
victory against the redlining practices through which U.S. banking institu-
tions continue to convert low and moderate income communities into vir-
tual wastelands by sucking them dry of the credit flows and investment
capital necessary to repair and improve physical infrastructures, enable ec-
onomic growth and maintain social stability, and by exporting local depos-
its in search of more profitable investment prospects elsewhere. 8 ' Like
the CRA, though through different procedures, the World Bank Inspec-
tion Panel is designed to make lending practices more accountable to the
communities they affect.8 2 My objective is to suggest how these two legal
regimes should be analyzed in an institutional-class analysis.
Both the CRA and the Inspection Panel are legal interventions de-
signed to reorganize pre-existing institutional arrangements.8 3 The CRA
80. See Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b) (1994)
(discussing Congressional purpose in area of Community Reinvestment). "It is the
purpose of this chapter to require each appropriate federal financial supervisory
agency to use its authority when examining financial institutions to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with
the safe and sound operations of such institutions." Id. See Kristine J. Dunkerton,
World Bank Inspection Panel and Its Affect on Lending Accountability to Citizens of Borrow-
ing Nations, 5 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 226, 226 (1995) ("Historically, these citizens
were powerless to seek redress when bank-funded projects adversely affected them
or the borrowing nation's environment. It was not until the creation of the Panel
that the Bank adopted procedures for citizen appeals.").
81. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It
Works, But Strengthened Federal Enforcement is Needed, 20 FoRDHAM U RB. L.J. 293, 294
(1993) (stating CRA has been successful against redlining practices, but is still con-
troversial and subject to weak enforcement).
82. See Dunkerton, supra note 80, at 241 (stating Inspection Panel designed to
grant citizens with mechanism for seeking relief against World Bank practices).
83. See Fishbein, supra note 81, at 294 (stating that CRA was designed to
"change the practices of the lending industry"). In addition to re-organizing pre-
existing institutional arrangements, the CRA was also aimed at modifying the be-
havior and practices of the federal banking supervisors. See id. at 293-94 (discuss-
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intervenes in the allocation of finance capital by targeting institutional ar-
rangements that are themselves organized by a number of domestic legal
regimes, including banking and consumer protection laws, civil rights stat-
utes and common law doctrines like the business judgment rule. These
domestic legal regimes construct institutional classes by organizing rela-
tions of power/lessness among the various groups that interact in and
through these institutional structures, such as bank managers, regulators,
depositors, borrowers and community reinvestment organizations-all of
whom are interested in, and affected by, capital allocation decisions. The
Inspection Panel, on the other hand, targets institutional arrangements
organized by international law and development practices. These are the
institutional arrangements that both constitute and mediate relations of
power/lessness among international organizations, sovereign states and a
growing number of internationally mobilized NGOs (non-governmental
organizations). In both instances, the important point is that law or-
ganizes classes by organizing the power relations that will operate in differ-
ent institutional contexts.
The organization of power constructs institutional classes and deter-
mines the relative disjuncture these classes will experience in the relation-
ship between structure and agency. Institutional classes with significant
institutional power will experience little disjuncture; others more
marginalized within the power relations that organize the institution will
confront significant disjuncture between their objectives and aspirations
for the institution, and their ability to effectuate these objectives in and
through the institution. As a result, institutionally marginalized classes oft-
entimes have no alternative but to seek their objectives through external
and oftentimes illegal mobilization, thus incurring the costs and suffering
the legal vulnerability that invariably accompanies such mobilization. 8 4
An institutional-class analysis thus enables us to see similarities in the
way power is structured across different institutional contexts and regula-
tory frameworks. Law is pervasively implicated in the organization of insti-
tutional classes. Racial spaces, defined by poverty, marginalization and
immobility, are produced through patterns of disinvestment decisions
which are themselves outcomes of differential power among institutional
classes. Clearly, some classes profit from these patterns of dis/invest-
ments; others have struggled hard to transform them. Yet, the structures
of institutional authority, that law defines and enforces against both inter-
ing implicit goals of CRA); Dunkerton, supra note 80, at 226 (noting creation of
World Bank Inspection Panel gave adversely affected citizens ability to "seek re-
dress," and that prior to Panel creation, no such ability existed).
84. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 49 (exploring this point through case study of
labor/community activism involving coercive police intervention); see also, e.g.,
Iglesias, supra note 26, at 404-34 (exploring way judicial interpretation marginal-




nal and external challenge, determine the interests that routinely prevail
in any institutional-class conflict.
In the struggle over the allocation of capital, for example, law dictates
who will have the power to determine the allocation of capital, the deci-
sion criteria that can be lawfully used, the purposes against which such
decisions will be measured, the level of accountability of the deci-
sionmakers to affected parties and interests, and the review procedures
through which their accountability is operationalized. The distribution of
power within an institutional arrangement depends on where and how
different groups are positioned in relation to each of these decision points
and processes. Accordingly, institutional-class analysis seeks to reveal the
way power is legally distributed among the different groups within specific
institutional contexts in order to better understand how law is implicated
in producing the relations of power/lessness, which in turn enables the
continuing reproduction of the poverty and subordination that are mani-
fested as racial spaces. This analysis is both structural and discursive be-
cause it focuses both on the way different group interests are positioned
within institutional structures, and on the way these interests are represented
in dominant legal discourse. A brief review of the CRA and the World
Bank Inspection Panel will help to illustrate these points more concretely.
A. The Community Reinvestment Act
The story of the CRA is a particularly useful place to examine the role
of law and legal theory in progressive social change, particularly given my
earlier analysis of the way collective action is embedded in structural con-
straints which can fundamentally distort its ultimate social impact. These
structural constraints on the agency of the oppressed are precisely the
kinds of constraints that have most effectively withstood the impact of in-
surgent attacks or direct collective protests, because they exist, operate
and stake out their longevity in the realm of ideas. The realm of ideas
establishes the parameters of legal reform, and these parameters must be
redefined and replaced by a successful revolution in the same realm of
ideas-a revolution whose major resource is critical theory.
The CRA has been a controversial flash point ever since it was first
enacted in 1977.85 Neo-liberal conservatives have attacked the statute as a
special interest political intervention that threatens the ultimate viability
of the American banking system by distorting economic rules of supply
and demand, requiring federally regulated banking institutions to make
unprofitable loans in order to advance non-economic social and political
objectives, and superimposing an outdated model of community banking
on an increasingly integrated global market to the detriment of all inter-
85. See Calvin Bradford & Gale Cincotta, The Legacy, the Promise, and the Unfin-
ished Agenda, in FROM REDLINING TO REINVESTMENT; COMMUNITY RESPONSES TO UR-
BAN DEVELOPMENT, supra note 77, at 280-81 (discussing initial debates at time of
CRA passage in 1977 as well as re-emerging debates in 1991).
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ested parties, including the low and moderate income communities it
seeks to protect.8 6 Government allocation of credit is, to the neo-liberal
conservative mind, an embryonic cancer embedded in the Act, poised at
any politically opportune moment to escape the boundaries of the Act and
deliver the U.S. banking system to the inefficiencies of a state-managed
economy or, worse yet, to socialism.
Looking at the statute, one might wonder at all the hysteria. The stat-
ute establishes no private right of action and indeed imposes nojusticiable
obligation whatsoever. It simply directs each of the four federal banking
regulatory agencies8 7 "to assess" and "take into ...account" an institu-
tion's record in "meeting the credit needs of its entire community, includ-
ing low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe
and sound operation of such institution," when deciding whether to ap-
prove an application for a deposit facility by a banking institution under
their supervision. 88 And yet this statute is credited by its supporters (and
detractors) for redirecting the flow of significant amounts of capital into
community development projects, albeit for reasons that have nothing to
do with the operation of the Act's intended enforcement structure.89 In-
deed, the CRA has never operated as initially intended.
As legally structured, the substantive obligations of the Act, requiring
regulated institutions to refrain from geographic discrimination by meet-
ing the credit needs of low- and moderate- income communities, were to
be enforced by bank regulators at such time as regulated institutions
86. See Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions
Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM UPB. L.J. 281, 281-83 (1993) (attacking
CRA as "fundamentally flawed").
87. See Richard Marsico, supra note 23, at 170 n.4 (describing CRA enforce-
ment responsibilities that are divided among four federal regulatory agencies).
88. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (1) (1994) (discussing evaluation citeria for appli-
cations for deposit facilities). Congress strengthened the statute in 1989 by requir-
ing bank regulators to prepare a public, written evaluation of the applicant's CRA
performance and establishing a new system for rating the level of compliance with
CRA requirements. See id. at § 2906(a) (providing for written evaluations). The
1989 amendments also required CRA ratings be made public for the first time. See
id. at § 2906(b) (providing for public sections of agency report). In 1995, federal
regulatory agencies finalized a series of new regulations making important
changes, including new evaluation criteria. See E. L. Baldinucci, The Community
Reinvestment Act: New Standards Provide New Hope, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 846-47
(1996) (discussing implementation of 1995 regulations and evaluation criteria
contained in final agency regulations). Nevertheless, the Act remains the subject of
controversy and congressional efforts to repeal it are sustained and persistent. See
id. at 846 (discussing "litany of attacks" from same members of Congress).
89. See Bradford & Cincotta, supra note 85, at 280 (noting that despite "visible
progress," regulators have not traditionally enforced CRA rules, but instead left
"the means of meeting the objective of the Act up to each lender and the commu-
nity"); see also Fishbein, supra note 81, at 298 ("The CRA is credited with resulting
in total commitments in excess of $30 billion to poor communities throughout the
country, far exceeding whatever conditions would have been imposed by regula-
tors."); cf Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 331-32 (arguing that dollar values are
not as significant as they appear at first glance).
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might submit an application to acquire a depository facility.90 An adverse
CRA finding would provide a basis for the agency to withhold approval of
the applicant's business plans. However, throughout the history of the
Act, bank regulators have rarely denied expansion applications on CRA
grounds. Instead, the effectiveness of the CRA enforcement process has
rested in the leverage it has provided community groups in negotiating
community reinvestment agreements.9 1 Prior to the CRA's enactment,
anti-redlining community struggles had no avenue of effective agency
other than public demonstrations and deposit withdrawal campaigns be-
cause requests to negotiate with bank management about bank investment
practices were routinely ignored or affirmatively rebuffed. 92 The CRA
changed this dynamic by making bank regulatory procedures a forum
where community complaints about redlining practices would have to be
heard, thus threatening to delay the approval of bank applications even if
the regulators ultimately decided to approve the application."5
From an institutional class perspective, the CRA is a useful start in the
right direction. A private right of action to enforce justiciable substantive
obligations in a judicial forum arguably might have substantially de-
politicized community organizations by shifting agency from community
group organizers to lawyers, who would then fight in the relatively inacces-
sible forums of judicial process. Instead, the CRA effected a significant
redistribution of institutional power between bank managers, regulators
and communities, by providing community groups with formal standing to
intervene in the regulatory process through which banking institutions get
their business expansion plans approved.9 4 This standing has provided
community groups with the leverage they needed to be heard. Bank man-
agers started earnestly negotiating with community groups only after the
CRA's intervention altered the institutional balance of power between
management and communities. This redistribution of power occurred
90. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a) (describing agency assessment that is to be made
of applying institution's record). An application to acquire a depository facility
includes applications for national bank or thrift institution charters, deposit insur-
ance in connection with a newly chartered depository institution, the establish-
ment of a domestic branch, the relocation of a home or branch office, merger or
consolidation with a depository institution, the acquisition of the assets of a deposi-
tory institution, the assumption of the liabilities of a depository institution and the
acquisition of shares in a depository institution requiring approval under the Fed-
eral Bank Holding Company Act or Savings Association Holding Company Act. See
12 U.S.C. § 2902(3)(b)-(e) (listing what situations constitute "application [s] for
deposit facilit[ies]").
91. See Fishbein, supra note 81, at 298 (stating that "the effectiveness of the
CRA challenge process usually rests with the ability of the community group lead-
ers to negotiate an agreement").
92. See White, supra note 86, at 281-83 (attacking CRA as "fundamentally
flawed").
93. See id. (same).
94. See Fishbein, supra note 81, at 297 (discussing importance of providing
standing to intervene for community organizations).
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not because bank regulators were particularly responsive to CRA protests,
but because these protests could trigger substantial, if not fatal, delays in
implementing the business plans that bank managers desire to pursue.
This, in turn, ensured that the "real action" remained at the negotiating
table, where community groups and bank managers would work out lend-
ing commitments in order to advert CRA protests, rather than channeling
the action into the regulatory process, where community organizers and
negotiators would most likely give way to legal advocates.
The redistribution of power effected through the CRA enforcement
structure has made the Act highly controversial, leading opponents to
complain that it authorizes regulatory extortion and gives community
groups the "extraordinary authority to hold up mergers and other obliga-
tions."95 The CRA has been attacked more generally for introducing spe-
cial interest politics into, and subordinating the economic logic of the
market in, the allocation of capital.96 In one of many legislative rounds,
CRA opponents proposed to amend the statute to completely eliminate
the original enforcement mechanism in favor of a "market solution" based
on full disclosure. 9 7 The idea behind this market-based solution is that
bank customers would be free to enforce the CRA by taking their business
elsewhere.
More recently, after years of political mobilization, CRA opponents
have managed to strike a major blow at the democratizing elements of the
CRA enforcement structure through various provisions of the Financial
Services Modernization Act of 1999.98 These provisions establish "safe
harbors," which alter the examination schedule for banks having assets of
less than $250 million by providing that such banks shall not be examined
more than once every four to five years, depending on the rating received
during their last CRA examination. They also impose significant new bur-
dens on community groups asserting CRA challenges by establishing a pre-
sumption of compliance absent substantial verifiable information to the
contrary, thus increasing the community group's costs of even "getting to
the table." Finally, and perhaps most disturbing, the so-called "sunshine
provisions" of the Act affirmatively discriminate against CRA community
95. Credit Opportunity Amendments Act of 1997, 143 Cong. Rec. E72-01 (state-
ment of Rep. Bill McCollum).
96. See id. (noting problems of CRA and introduction of CRA Amendment).
97. See id. (noting problem of enforcement mechanism of current CRA).
98. The Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 was officially enacted as
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. (113
Stat.) 1338. This legislation, which has been called "the granddaddy of all finan-
cial deregulation" significantly lowers barriers between the banking and securities
industries established by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, as well as barriers that the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 established between the banking and insur-
ance industries. See Ralph Nader, The Democrats Bow to the Megabanks, THE PROGRES-
swE, Jan. 2000, at 24 (noting. that financial sector tossed $155 million to
congressional candidates in 1998 election, while "House-Senate conferees, who
made the critical decisions on the final shape of the legislation, received more
than $16 million among themselves").
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groups by imposing differential regulatory burdens on CRA agreements.
These new regulatory burdens require parties to such agreements to re-
port annually on the terms of such agreements-but only when the agree-
ments are between a depository institution and a non-governmental entity
or person who has commented on, testified about, discussed with or other-
wise contacted the bank concerning the CRA. Agreements made with de-
velopers and for-profit corporations are not covered-only agreements
entered into in response to CRA inquiries or enforcement efforts.
These new provisions substantially alter the distribution of institu-
tional power previously organized by the enforcement structure of the
CRA. Community groups now face new barriers against participating ef-
fectively in CRA negotiations with regulated institutions. They not only
bear substantial new costs in getting to the bargaining table, but the paper
and accounting work associated with "sunshine" reporting may also in-
crease the costs of administering negotiated agreements to degrees that
make the struggle for such agreements pointless. The fact that these new
provisions discriminate against low- and moderate-income community
groups based on their exercise of basic First Amendment rights of free-
dom of expression, such as the right to testify and to petition government,
suggests that the next major round in this struggle will be kicked back to
the courts. This leads me to two final points-both informed by an effort
to imagine the kind of theory required to intervene effectively in the con-
tinuing struggle over community participation in the allocation of finan-
cial capital.
The first point is that the CRA will remain a highly visible and vulner-
able target until some significant victories are won in the realm of legal
discourse. This is particularly true if the next round of challenges is to be
waged in the courts, where the interpretation of constitutional doctrine
has long been captive to the ideological and rhetorical manipulation of
discursive constructs like the economic/political dichotomy.99 In this
field of contestation, the most significant victory would be to delegitimate
definitively the economic/political dichotomy, particularly as it is rhetori-
cally manipulated and strategically deployed in neo-liberal discourses.
This is because neo-liberal conservatives effortlessly translate the funda-
mental conflicts of values and interests (reflected in CRA struggles over
the purposes and procedures that should guide the allocation of capital)
into a simplistic battle between "efficient markets" and "inefficient special
interest political interventionism." Unpacking the unjustified assumptions
and affirmative misrepresentations embedded in such formulations would
alter the discursive universe in which the CRA is both attacked and
defended.
Second, and equally important, an institutional-class analysis in-
formed by theoretical advances made in the study of social movement for-
mations and post-modern political identities suggests that the foregoing
99. See generally Iglesias, supra note 79.
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analysis of the institutional-class conflict between bank managers and com-
munity organizations explores only one dimension of the inter-class dy-
namics that must be attended to in developing legal interventions which
will produce more progressive institutional arrangements. For example,
communities may be inadequately represented and/or some community
representatives may be tempted to cut special deals for their particular
constituents when negotiating community reinvestment plans at the bar-
gaining table with bank managers. This raises many of the same issues
raised by a Critical Race Feminist analysis of exclusive representation in
the context of labor's collective bargaining with management. 10 0 Identify-
ing these issues and designing institutional reforms that can address them
is important theoretical work which will go a long way toward channeling
reform energies into the kinds of structures that will make emancipatory
agency more effective in struggling against the institutional processes that
produce racial spaces.
B. The World Bank Inspection Panel
Like the earlier CRA analysis, an institutional-class analysis of the
World Bank Inspection Panel begins by identifying the various institu-
tional classes whose interactions are mediated by the legal regimes into
which the Inspection Panel intervenes. These classes include the sover-
eign borrowers, bank project managers, non-governmental organizations
representing affected communities, the affected communities as self-con-
scious and mobilized agents, and project contractors such as suppliers, en-
gineers and planners. The second step is to identify the power bases of
each institutional class, the way their interactions are legally mediated and
the way these institutionalized relations of the powerless are implicated in
the decisional outcomes through which World Bank ("Bank") develop-
ment projects have contributed to the production of poverty and the
proliferation of racial spaces throughout the Third World.
The Inspection Panel was established by the Executive Directors of
the World Bank in 1993 in response to heavy criticism that the Bank's
lending practices were irrational, that its financing of large scale energy
projects had resulted in the involuntary resettlement of numerous viable
communities and that its policies promoted environmental destruction in
the areas purportedly under development. The quality of the Bank's port-
folio was judged low, and its lending practices increasingly
unprofitable. 1 01
The Inspection Panel establishes a potentially significant precedent
that may open the way for more fundamental institutional reforms in the
100. See generally Iglesias, supra note 26 (analyzing problems women of color
confront in bargaining with management and obtaining fair representation, given
structure of legal rights at intersection of Title VII and NLRA).
101. See Bradlow, supra note 19, at 564 (describing problems with Bank's man-
agement and portfolio). See generally Hey, supra note 24, at 61 (discussing impact
of Inspection Panel on World Bank).
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field of international law and development. It is the first time that an in-
ternational forum has been created to deal specifically with the claims of
non-state, non-business groups affected by the decisions of an interna-
tional organization. These same communities were formerly prisoners of
impunity, locked behind the legal fiction of state sovereignty. I call it a
fiction because the doctrine of sovereignty has not served to shield Third
World governments from the intrusive and coercive conditions attached to
many World Bank loans, particularly structural adjustment loans.102 Nev-
ertheless, the doctrine of sovereignty has been routinely invoked to make
the state's internal political process, that is, its treatment of its own citi-
zens, unreviewable and, ultimately, irrelevant to the negotiation of World
Bank development loans. Indeed, the World Bank has routinely dismissed
allegations of project-related human rights violations by borrower govern-
ments on the grounds that its Articles of Agreement prohibit the Bank
from interfering in the domestic "political affairs" of its member states. 10 3
The case of the Chixoy River Dam project in Guatemala is a notorious
example of how bad these project-related human rights violations can
get.10 4 In 1978, the World Bank lent Guatemala $72 million to build a
dam on the Chixoy River. When the local population, mostly indigenous
Achi Indians, began to organize in order to resist their eviction from the
area, the state responded. Three soldiers assigned to guard the project
site fired on a group of citizens that had gathered in a nearby church to
rally against the project. Seven people were killed. Terrorized but deter-
mined, the people continued to condemn the government's relocation
plan, particularly its failure to provide fair compensation. The villagers
were then ordered to report to a civil defense meeting at a nearby village.
Seventy-two of the seventy-three men who went to the meeting were assas-
sinated. A month later, a group of soldiers attacked the village, which at
that point was populated almost entirely by women and children, because
the men had gone into hiding after the earlier massacre. The women and
102. See Iglesias, supra note 3, at 382 n.50 (deconstructing rhetorical manipu-
lation of concept of sovereignty in and through critical analysis of its deployment
for and against alternative proposals to link human rights enforcement to articula-
tion of international economic law).
103. See Daniel D. Bradlow, The World Bank, the IMF, and Human Rights, 6
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54 (1996) (noting that Articles of both
IBRD and IDA state that "[t]he Bank and its officers shall not interfere in the
political affairs of any member, nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by
the political character of the member or members concerned. Only economic
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions.").
104. See Probe International, World Bank Energy Complex Creates Hell On Earth
For Indian Citizens (visited 8/30/98 and no longer online) <bttp://www.nextcity.
com/Probelnternational/WorldBank/index.html> [hereinafter Probe Interna-
tional] ("Possibly the worst human rights outrage ever associated with one of the
Bank's projects occurred in Guatemala." citing CATHERINE CAUFIELD, MASTERS Or
ILLUSION: THE WORLD BANK AND THE POVERTY OF NATIONS (1996)).
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children were raped, killed and their bodies were thrown into the
ravines.10 5
Four months after the massacre, the village disappeared into the ris-
ing waters of the Chixoy reservoir; but when the dam was completed, it did
not work. As it turned out, the dam was built in a geologically unstable
area known for seismic faults. There were so many engineering errors that
the dam stopped producing electricity after five months of operation. The
World Bank's response was to lend the government of Guatemala another
$47 million for repairs. Due to corruption, mismanagement and incompe-
tence, the initially projected $340 million dam ended up costing $1 bil-
lion, not to mention the destruction of an entire village and the murder of
its inhabitants. 10 6
Although these events occurred twenty years ago, instances of project-
related human rights violations continue. Indeed, of the ten formal Re-
quests for Inspection processed by the World Bank's Inspection Panel dur-
ing its first three years, at least one case involved allegations of grievous
violations directed specifically at communities attempting to resist the de-
structive impact of a World Bank financed project. 10 7 This Request for
Inspection concerned the Bank's failure to comply with its numerous in-
ternal policies and operational directives in connection with the World
Bank's National Thermal Power Corporation Project in India. According
to Probe International, Indian project authorities resorted to a whole
range of repressive tactics designed to force the local population to move
from the project area. 10 8 State officials engaged in reported beatings, ar-
rests, surveillance, imprisonment and destruction of property, even as Na-
tional Thermal Power Corporation ("NTPC") contractors forcibly
bulldozed the land of families who had not agreed to move.109 Almost
200,000 people have been removed from expropriated farmlands and
forced into crowded resettlement colonies, where they have been rele-
gated to small subsistence plots and short-term contract work. 110 Not only
have they been denied the supposed benefits of the project (e.g., electric-
ity), but the basic infrastructure of the settlements has not been main-
tained. This has resulted in lack of water, clogged drains, broken water
pumps and a lack of medical supplies or services. 111
105. See id. (describing events that occurred in connection with Dam of
Chixoy River).
106. See id. (noting that cost of dam rose from estimated 340 million to 1
billion dollars).
107. See WORLD BANK INSPECTION PANEL, 1996-97 ANNUAL REPORT (Request
No. 10: India: National Thermal Power Corporation Project).
108. See generally Probe International, supra note 104 (describing methods
used to force locals from project area).
109. See id.
110. See id. ("Since the beginning of the Singrauli Energy Complex, almost
200,000 people have been forced to abandon their homes and livelihood.").
111. See id. (describing living conditions in resettlement colonies).
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The lack of any effective avenue of agency within the state's political
and administrative structure for affected communities to resist the harm-
ful impact of development projects has been a fundamental and constitu-
tive element of community powerlessness. Standing to invoke the
Inspection Panel may change the relations of power/lessness between
communities and state officials by providing communities with an alterna-
tive avenue of recourse: direct access to the World Bank's Executive Direc-
tors by way of the Inspection Panel and its mandate to ensure that World
Bank projects are implemented in a manner consistent with the Bank's
internal policies and operational directives. These directives cover a
whole range of issues, from public participation at all stages of a project to
the appropriate procedures for conducting environmental assessments.
Indeed, the Request for Inspection in the NTPC case cited violations of no
less than six of the World Bank's internal policies and operational direc-
tives: in particular, its directives on (1) Economic Evaluation of Investment
Operations, (2) Environmental Assessments, (3) Involuntary Resettle-
ments, (4) Indigenous Peoples, (5) Project Supervision and (6) Commu-
nity Participation.1 12
As with the CRA and the continuing controversy that surrounds it, the
ability to generate an institutional regime that internalizes the claims and
interests, and routinizes the participation of impoverished communities in
the decision-making processes through which World Bank investment cap-
ital is allocated, depends partly on our ability to redefine the way in which
the economic/political dichotomy is mapped across the discursive fields of
law-in this case, the field of international economic law. It is precisely
this dichotomy that underpins and legitimizes the substantial limitations
imposed on the Inspection Panel's jurisdiction to conduct inspections and
make recommendations that address allegations of project-related human
rights violations. The Panel's jurisdiction is narrowly restricted to deter-
mining whether the Bank's staff has failed to comply with the Bank's own
internal policies and directives. The Panel is not authorized to assess the
legality of state actions under international human rights law, for this
might too quickly produce substantial interventions in the domestic politi-
cal affairs of the borrower state. Its limited jurisdiction keeps the Panel
within the boundaries of economic concerns because it ensures that the
Panel will function only to make Bank staff accountable to Bank policies,
which are themselves designed to promote the economic viability of the
Bank's projects, as defined by the Bank's management. Proposals to ex-
pand the Panel's jurisdiction to address human rights violations by offi-
cials of the borrower would quickly confront the fiction of state
sovereignty as inscribed in the political prohibition of the Bank's Articles
of Agreement.
112. See generally Hey, supra note 24 (noting violations of World Bank Internal
Policy).
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Equally significant, the Inspection Panel has no jurisdiction to con-
duct investigations or make recommendations in cases where the alleged
harms suffered are caused not by the Bank's Staff's failure to follow inter-
nal policies or directives, but rather, by the Bank's policies themselves.
From an institutional class perspective, the implications of this jurisdic-
tional limitation are profound. The fact that a Panel Inspection may lead
the Executive Board of Directors to pull the plug on projects where the
state's actions are inconsistent with Bank policies may certainly empower
communities in their interactions with state officials eager for the Bank's
financial assistance, but it does nothing to empower communities vis-a-vis
the Bank's Executive Board or its policies. The Panel's recommendations
are merely advisory to the Executive Board, which is itself constituted
through a governance structure of weighted voting. Under the Bank's Ar-
ticles of Agreement, voting rights are allocated among member states ac-
cording to the state's contributions to the Bank's callable capital, thus
ensuring greater influence over Bank policies and activities to capital-ex-
porters over debtor states and, in particular, to the United States. Thus,
the Inspection Panel may simply end up encouraging communities to
place their hopes and channel their energies into appeals to a highly polit-
ical and ultimately unresponsive, if not positively hostile forum that is
dominated, at best, by the assumptions of neo-liberal economic ideology
or, at worst, by the strategic self-interested policies of the richest countries.
From this perspective, it is important to note that none of the ten
Requests for Inspection formally reported in the Inspection Panel's first
two annual reports deal with any claim arising out of a World Bank struc-
tural adjustment loan. 1 3 With just two exceptions,"14 each of the Re-
quests has focused exclusively on claims arising out of World Bank project
loans. This is curious because the Bank has increasingly focused on policy-
based lending since the 1980s. 11 5 Its structural adjustment loans have
been disbursed throughout the Third World, and particularly in Latin
America, to induce Third World governments to implement domestic pol-
icies more consistent with neo-liberal economic ideology. This has meant
a standard recipe of cuts in public services, privatization of state-controlled
enterprises, elimination of subsidies for domestic consumption, export-
promotion policies that channel resources away from production for the
domestic market in order to earn the foreign exchange needed to repay
113. See World Bank Inspection Panel, 1994-96 ANNUAL REPORT (1996) (not-
ing absence of claims surrounding structural adjustment loans in Request for In-
spection 2: Compensation for Expropriation of Foreign Assets in Ethiopia, 1995).
114. See id. (rejecting request on grounds that requestor had not exhausted
local remedies and that requestor failed to show how failure to compensate was
consequence of Bank actions or omissions); see also WORLD BANK INSPECTION
PANEL, 1996-97 ANNUAL REPORT (1997) (rejecting management's claim that it had
no responsibility for implementation of sectoral adjustment in Request for Inspec-
tion 8: Jute Sector Adjustment Credit, Bangladesh, 1996).
115. See generally Probe International, supra note 104 (noting policy-based
lending beginning in 1980s).
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both the World Bank and other international creditors, elimination of ex-
change controls, and currency devaluations that raise the domestic price
of imports.
These conditions, so routinely attached to World Bank structural ad-
justment loans, constitute major incursions into the domestic policy-mak-
ing prerogatives of the state. Moreover, these loan conditionalities have
also escalated the political instability of numerous Third World govern-
ments precisely because they oftentimes trigger substantial opposition
from affected communities. 116 In Nicaragua, to give just one example,
government "stabilization" policies aimed at meeting the conditions of a
World Bank structural adjustment loan provoked a remobilization of ex-
combatants, with the ex-contras and ex-Sandanistas even joining together
in 1992 to protest the government's failure to keep its promises of access
to land, credit and employment. 117 Again, in 1994, Nicaraguans re-
sponded to the economic crisis generated by the government's structural
adjustment policies with a series of public strikes-including a transporta-
tion strike against high fuel prices that effectively stopped the distribution
of goods within the country for eight days. 118
Although a number of Latin American governments have tried to ad-
dress popular concerns through a constructive national dialogue and to
resist the conditionalities imposed by World Bank structural adjustment
loans, 119 neither dialogue nor resistance has been very effective, in large
part because the terms of the World Bank structural adjustment loans are,
in effect, non-negotiable. 120 They are driven by the self-serving ideology
116. See The Development Group for Alternative Policies, Structural Adjustment
and the Spreading Crisis in Latin America (visited 11/13/00) <http://www.igc.apc.
org/dgap/crisis.html> [hereinafter Development Group] (noting political insta-
bility derived from World Bank loans).
117. See id. (discussing response to government's failure to keep promises).
118. See id. ("An August 1994 transportation strike protesting hikes in fuel
prices, for example, effectively halted the distribution of goods within the country
for eight days.").
119. See Diana E. Moller, Intervention, Coercion, orJustifiable Need? A Legal Anal-
ysis of Structural Adjustment Lending in Costa Rica, 2 Sw. J. L. & TRADE Am. 483, 486
(Fall 1995) (noting Costa Rica's attempt to debate and reject conditions of World
Bank loan).
120. See Development Group, supra note 116 (reporting on 1994 World
Bank/IMF consultations in which Nicaraguan government arranged to include
several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and academic groups). The fol-
lowing proposition reveals that the government did not intend to change the
programs:
NGOs, many of whom came to the sessions with their own analyses and
alternative proposals, reported that the meetings on the adjustment pack-
age were little more than briefings on the programs planned by the Bank
and the Fund with scant opportunity for constructive dialogue. Whatever
the government's intentions in organizing the meetings, in reality it had
little latitude to change the nature of the adjustment program, given the
loan conditions of the international financial institutions and its own des-
perate need for foreign exchange.
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of the rich, which proclaims, like opponents of the CRA in the United
States, that unregulated private markets will produce higher standards of
living in the long run, despite abundant evidence that the "long run" has
come and gone, leaving only an increasing concentration of wealth among
elites across the globe, the further immiseration of the poor, and the deg-
radation of their standards of living and the spaces they inhabit.
It is certainly possible that some of the Bank's internal policies and
operational directives might be invoked to challenge some aspect of a par-
ticular structural adjustment loan. Any challenge going directly to the
question whether structural adjustment loan conditionalities violate fun-
damental international human rights, however, would be beyond the
scope of the Inspection Panel's current jurisdiction. Proposals to expand
the Panel's jurisdiction to address such complaints would immediately
confront the opposition of precisely those states whose interests are served
by the structural adjustment conditionalities imposed on borrower states.
That is, the rich capital exporting states of the North, whose power in the
interstate system is reflected in the weighted voting-rights structure
through which the Bank is governed. These states are unlikely to give the
Panel the power to review the policies that they themselves are promoting
through the Bank. Indeed they have not even given the Panel the power
to make binding determinations about the staffs compliance with the
Bank's own policies.
Thus, whatever the impact of the Inspection Panel on the conflict
between government officials and the peoples they govern, it is clear that
this conflict is embedded within a broader conflict between rich and poor
across many institutional contexts, organized by both domestic and inter-
national law. As with the CRA, a definitive discursive victory over the eco-
nomic/political dichotomy would be a worthwhile achievement. If
nothing else, this kind of victory would make asymmetrical allocations of
institutional power more immediately apparent, thus enabling more in-
formed responses. Just as my institutional-class analysis of the CRA sug-
gests reasons why legal reform efforts should aim at keeping and
expanding "the action" at the negotiating table between banks and com-
munities, the foregoing analysis of the Inspection Panel regime suggests
reasons why "the action" over World Bank lending practices is still lodged
in the legislative forums and executive apparatus of First World govern-
ments. While I certainly would welcome a reinvigorated grassroots mobili-
zation of the American people intent on reclaiming the power of the U.S.
government on behalf of our fundamental commitments to basic human-
ity and global justice, in the meantime I simply want to suggest that the
whole purpose of deconstructing the economic/political dichotomy is to
promote the development of alternative legal regimes and institutional
mechanisms that will move "the action" out of the U.S. Departments of
Treasury and Commerce and into some other space, where the effective
participation and adequate representation of affected communities will be
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better positioned to put the World Bank out of the business of producing
racial spaces.
IV. CONCLUSION
I would like to conclude with a few reflections on the kind of legal
theory that is well worth the effort of RaceCrit and LatCrit scholars. First,
there is no question that power relations are central to the production of
racial spaces, nor is there any question that these relations of power/less-
ness are mapped across the economic and political institutions of the state
and the market. There is likewise no question that we are every day in the
process of discovering new aspects, dynamics and expressions of power.
As legal scholars, RaceCrits and LatCrits have a particular role to play in
contributing to progressive social transformation, which includes the pro-
duction of theoretical work that increases our understanding of the way
racialized spaces are produced through the legal organization of the so-
cial, political and economic institutions.
The call for institutional-class analysis is thus a call for a detailed anal-
ysis of the kinds of decision processes that law institutionalizes in different
institutional contexts and the way authority over these decisions is allo-
cated among competing groups within any particular institutional context.
The emphasis here is on the way law organizes authority and disorganizes
the avenues of effective dissent, with an emphasis on concrete rather than
generalized explanations of the way power is constructed. This emphasis
is because only such particularized analysis can enable us to envision how
relations of power/lessness can and should be reconstructed in specific
institutions. 21
Secondly, analyzing the terms of the struggle over institutional struc-
tures is a practice that quickly moves into an analysis of law as a discursive
universe, constructed by and manipulated through the deployment of di-
chotomies like economic/politics and special interests/common good.
Thus, discursive analysis (analysis of discursive structures that organize le-
gal doctrine and political rhetoric) is critical to the analysis of law's role in
the production of institutional class structures.
Finally, this call for institutional-class analysis is a call to move beyond
the race/class dichotomy and domestic myopia that have disorganized and
demobilized so many progressive coalitions.1 22 The major obstacle to
community control of capital is not some supposed conflict between class
struggles against economic exploitation and racial struggles against white
supremacy-racial spaces are produced by both. Instead, the problem is
that every legislative intervention, regulatory reform or new strategy of di-
121. See Carrasco, supra note 57, at 330-31 (urging LatCrit scholars to master
and engage language of economic analysis and finance theory in order to equip
themselves for radical monitoring necessary to combat structural discrimination
that neo-liberal policies and institutional arrangements tend to produce).
122. See, e.g., Iglesias, supra note 28.
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rect political action is eventually filtered through legal discourses where
the dichotomization of economics and politics is strategically manipulated
to maintain structures of privilege and to resist the democratization of
both the state and the economy.
Viewed against this backdrop, Critical Race Theory is best understood
as an anti-subordination project in the production of legal scholarship.
However removed or immediate legal scholarship may be to the struggle
against subordination, the fact is that the production of legal scholarship
would go on without Critical Race Theory if RaceCrits were ever mis-
guided enough to abandon the field. It would continue because legal
scholarship serves the important function of rationalizing, synthesizing
and disseminating the decision-outcomes and doctrinal formulations
through which legal institutions simultaneously deploy their own unique
forms of power and organize relations of power/lessness that operate in
virtually every other social institution that mediates human interaction.
From the public institutions of local, state and federal governments,
to private institutions like banks, corporations and labor unions, to even
the most supposedly intimate relations of family and sexuality, law is every-
where implicated in the organization of power/lessness. Critical Race
Theory thus has had, and will continue to have, a significant impact on the
struggle for social racial justice, precisely because law is about power, and
legal scholarship is about the rationalization of power. To the extent that
Critical Race Theory increases our collective understandings of the ways in
which law, legal process and legal institutions participate in the reproduc-
tion of subordination, it will help reveal the stakes in the production of
legal knowledge, and these stakes are very high indeed.
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